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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.JA~IEH ~IANPFACTURING

CO.,

a <'Orpor.ation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.

9887

vs.

E. I. \YIL.SOX,
Defe nda nt-Rrspondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
BTATEniENT OF FACTS
At the outset Respondent cannot agree with Appellant's Statement of the Facts. Indeed, Respondent i~
constrained to quote the foHowing fron1 a very recent
opinion of this Court in the case of Ortega vs. Thomas,
( F tah 1963) 383 P2d 406 :
"In setting forth the basis for appeal defendant's counsel have recited the facts according
to their own view of the evidence. The rule is so
fundamental that the facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the party who prevailed
below, that it is an indefensible imposition upon
this court and opposing counsel not to follow it."

1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Xot only has Appellant failed to refer to any of the
reported testilnony to support the facts stated by it;
but it has failed to have the entire record transrnitted
to this Court to enable the Court to asce~tain what the
faCits are from the record. This likewise leaves counsel
for Respondent at a distinct disadvantage because he
cannot refer to portions of the transeript of testimony
to correct the Statement of Facts reported h~' Appellant.
On Page 2 of its brief, Appellant states that Mr.
vVilson contacted Mr. Tuttle, a representative of James
Manufaeturing Company, .afrter 1\ir. vVilson had seen
a sample of a turkey feeder consisting of a small section
in operation at a turkey show in Salt Lake City. This
does not ten the full story. At the eonferenee with Mr.
Tuttle in Salt Lake City, Respondent advised that he
needed equipment which would feed 20,000 to 30,000
young tur.key poults to be brooded in the coop ·and adequately provide for their needs. l\Ir. Tuttle gave him
the assurance that the turkey feeder which he had seen
in a small section of about twelve feet could be and
would be able to operate in lengths of 400 feet (the en~ire
length of Mr. Wilson's proposed coop) and that it was
being successfully operated in other places where it had
been installed. (Tr. 13) :\lr. Tuttle further stated the
srnall turkeys would have no trouble eating from the
larger trough (Tr. 14) ·and Respondent had no reason
to doubt him because the small length he had seen
operated was filled to the brim. (Tr. 48) Respondent
testified that he explained his needs to 1\Ir. Tuttle and
relied upon Mr. Tuttle's judg1nent .and skill in determin2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing whether or not the turkey feeder equip1nent would
operate so as to provide adequate feed for the small
turkey poul b. l\Ir. Tuttle also de~igned and engineered for l\lr. Wilson the ventilating systein for Rel:;pondent'~ coop and stated that the system would
properly ventila;te the size coop which Mr. Wilson contemplated constructing and would maintain and provide
a uniforn1 te1nperature for the small turkey poults.
On Page 3 of its brief, Appellant states that frmn
1952 to 1958 l\Ir. \Vilson dealt with Utah Poultry and
Farmers Co-op. vVhile this statement is true, the succeeding s1trutement that 1\-Ir. vVilson purchased James way
Equipment fron1 Utah Poulltry and Farmers Co-op is
not correct. l\Ir. Wilson purchased the feeder equipment
and ventilating equipment (involved in the instant action) from Mr. Tuttle, the representative of James
:Manufacturing Company, Appellant herein. This has
been the clam of l\Ir. \Vilson from the inception of this
litigation, and was testified to by him both in his deposition and in the trial of the case. The fact 1hat the
equipment was purchased from James 1\-Ianufacturing
Company through its representative Ray Tuttle was also
acknowledged by Appellant in a letter which it wrote
to .Mr. \Yilson on April 7, 1959. This letter appears as
an Exhibit introduced in evidence both by Appellant
and Respondent. (Exhibit P-9 and Exhibit No. D-7) In
this letter, which was written by A. F. Kellenburg of
the Appellant company to l\Ir. E. I. Y{ilson, the following state1nent appears:

3
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''::\Ir. Ray Tuttle, who sold this eq_u,ipme11t, i:s,
of course, very familiar with the use of 26-inch
ceiling exhaust fans and roof ventilators." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, apparent that the state1nent on
Page 3 of Appellant's brief that "~Ir. Wilson arranged
to purchase fron1 Utah Poultry and Farn1ers Cooperative eight 26 inch ceiling fans" is also incorrect.
Again on Page 3 Appellant states that on February
21, 1958, Mr. Wilson met in the office of Utah Poultry
with various representatives of Appellant company and
the Utah Poultry, at which time a discussion ensued concerning the praeticality of using the feeder equipment
sold by James Manufacturing Company. However, as
stated on Page ± of the Statement of Faets, "Mr. Wilson
denied this eonversation and clai1ns that it never took
place." This is just one of a nu1nber of ins,tances in
which the evidence is in conflict.
Appellant refers to its Exhibit, P-15, as being evidence of the fact that Respondent purchased the equipmelllt from Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-operative
rather than from Appellant eompany. The Exhibit in
ques1tion merely indicates that it was billed to ~Ir. "\Viison's account by Utah Poultry. ::\Ir. Wilson's testimony
.and other exhibits show that Respondent was being
financed during the 1958 turkey-growing season by Utah
Poultry and that all purchases 1nade by hin1 were approved for financing and paid by Utah Poultry, including the purchase of turkey poults and other equipment.
The invoice referred to was issued by l'tah Poultry to
4
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j
I

Hesponclent in order to charge the itern to the
arcount.

latter'~

Again on Page -l- of the Appellant's brief appears
t!tP ~tatement that "'~lr. \\Tilson built the turkey brooder
coop and installed the ventilator S~'stern himself." vVhile
tlti~ i~ true, it is also true that the ventilating systmn
was designed by .Mr. Ray Tuttle, a representative of
.James .Manufacturing Company; and the plans and
dra\vings were given to :Mr. "\Vilson, who installed the
ventilating systmn in accordance with such design and
plan and upon the representation by ~Ir. Tuttle that the
ventilating equipment would properly ventilate and control the air in the turkey brooding coop. There is no
question but that both the ventilating system and the
feeding units were installed as they were supposed to be
installed, but the issue was whether they worked properly. Although the ventilating systen1 appeared to work
satisfactorily, it in fact pennitted drafts of air to descend upon the srnall turkey poults in one area of the
coop while air was being withdrawn through the ventilators in anO'ther area of the coop thereby chilling the
turkey poults and causing their death.

vVith respect to the feeding equipment, when the
feeding equipment was ins~talled in len~ths of 400 feet
as it was originally intended should be done, the wormauger designed to carry and distribute the turkey feed
uniformly throughout the length of the coop failed to
work properly and distribute adequate quantities of feed
along the trough. Respondent's evidence was to the
effect that the augers would not push the feed rnore than
5
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approxi1nately fifty feet. (Tr. 17) This was the testin1ony not only of l\lr. Wilson but also of other witnesses.
rrhere is no question but that the representatives of
James Manufaeturing Company cmne to Nephi to attempt to get the feeder equip1nent to work properly. In
fact, there is a dispute in the testin1ony as to wheher
it worked properly when they left, while :\11'. Wilson
denied that it did. (Tr. 51) 'Thereafter, Resopndent spent
considerable time and effort in trying to 1nodify the
auger so as to get the equipment to work. (Tr. 21-27)
As late as September 1958 Respondent was still adjusting the equipment. Exhibit D-14 is an invoice sho-wing
a purchase by Respondent from Appellant of 7 .augers
which were being modified and "leaded in" to 1nake the
equip1nent work at all. By this process of adjustment
and the repeated changing of these .augers and adjusting
them to the equipment irt was finally possible to get them
to work to some extent out in the field, although they
never did work in the brooding coop. (Tr. 50)
On Page 6 of its brief, Appellant states that after
the alleged defect in the feeding units w.as discovered
there was a conversation between :.Mr. Wilson and l\Ir.
Tuttle at 1\:fr. Wilson's turkey ranch in Nephi, Utah,
on or about March 10, 1958. Appellant states: '"At this
tin1e no complaint or n1ention of the defects in either
the ventilrutor system or the turkey feeder units was
Inade to Mr. Tuttle." This is not the fact. l\lr. vVilson
testified and claimed throughout these proceedings that
complaint was made to the James l\ianufacturing Company representatives of the defective feeder equipment,
that they sent representatives up to atten1pt to ma:ke
6
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the equipntent work, and that they failed to get it to
work by the time that they left, so that they were aware
at that time of the defective condition of the feeding
equiprnent and of :Mr. vVilson's claim in respect thereto.
('Tr. 51) Concerning the ventilating equipment, it is true
that no cl.airn was rnade until the early spring of 1959
~ince it wa~ not discovered until February of 1959 that
the ventilating equiprnent was functioning improperly.
A~ ~the testirnony in the case discloses, drafts were
created because the ventilators were not equipped with
dampers to prevent a back draf1t when they were not
working.
The statement on Page 6 of Appellant's brief that
"jir. vVilson asked :Mr. Tuttle if James Manufacturing
Company would sell these units to him direct -and finance
the units for him" (referring to other turkey feeders
·which were subsequently purchased) leaves a false irnpression. It is true that Mr. Wilson purchased these
units fronr James l\1:anufacturing Company just as he
purchased :the other feeding equipment and ventilating
equipment frorn James Manufacturing Company. The
only difference was that the first units were financed
through l~tah Poultry while the last purchase was financed by James :Manufacturing Company. According
to Respondent, at no time did he purchase any James
:Manufacturing Company equipment frorn the Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-operative.
Appellant's brief goes on to state purported facts
with reference to Respondent's failure to give notice of
the alleged defective equipment and his claim in respect
7
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thereto. However, we must again advise the Court that
all of the testirnony with respect to this rnaHer is not
before the Court. Respondent testified that he advised
the Appellant cornpany representatives from tirne to
time of the defeCJtive equiprnent and his clain1 in respect
thereto. Appellant refers to several iten1s of corTespondence between the parties as indicating that no claim
was n1ade by Respondent. However, the first letter dated
October 2, 1958 from Respondent to James io.Ianufacturing Cmnpany's Reliable divi~on at Los Angeles, California (Exhibit P-4) contains the following statement:
"After I had to ta:ke out your automatic
feeders frorn my coop I had to buy another type
to replace it, and that is what has caused me to
have to change rny plans on the way I will be able
to pay for this. I thought at the time that I had
to make this change, that I told you and Ray Tuttle that there would have to be some changes in
the arrangements to pay, but from what I can
gather from Mark Adamson that doesn't seem to
be the case."
This was not the first notice that the feeder equipnlent was defective. The rnatter was first brought to
the attention of Appellant when the feeders were installed in the coop in :March of 1958 and during the
subsequent atten1pts to correct the feeding equipment
so as to get it to work.
Finally, Appellant on Page 7 and 8 of its brief
refers to testimony elicited from Dr. Toyal A. Bagley
concerning the cause of death of various turkeys. vVhile
Dr. Bagley testified that from time to tirne he "posted"
8
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(that i~, exainined dead birds by an autopsy) and detennined that certain specific birds showed evidence of
certain diseases or conditions suffcient to cause dewth,
he also testified that thPre ·were 1nany birds examined
that did not show definite signs of disease or evidenced
conditions which could have been caused by draft or
improper ventilation. Nor was he the only person to
testify on this 1natter. Not only did ~Ir. Wilson testify
concerning death from piling up, smotthering, and other
causes directly attributable to the defective feeding
e<tuipment and the ventilating equipment, but also others
experienced in the busisness of brooding and raising
turkeys teSttified concerning their opinion as to the cause
of death. :K one of this testimony is before the Court.
In fact, it is significant to point out that the trial of this
case lasted a total of four days, durng which numerous
witnes~e~ were called by the Respondent as well as several by Appellant. The tes'tin1ony of none of these witnesses has been transcribed and reported to this Court.
Only a small part of the testimony of _Mr. Wilson is in
the record.
The foregoing 1n brief points out the differences
between Respondent and Appellant as to what the facts
of this case are; and since the record is not before the
Court i't must be presu1ned that the evidence supports
the verdict below.

9
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STA·TEMENT OF POINTS
Respondent will discuss the various points raised
by Appellant in its brief in the same order under the
following headings:
POINT I
ALLEGED ERROR IN ORDERING A JURY TRIAL
OVER OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF.
POINT II
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN EXCLUDING
ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES FROM THE COURTROOM WHEN PLAINTIFF INVOKED THE EXCLUSION
RULE.
POINT III
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN ADMITTING
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 8.
POINT IV
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN FAILING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 'TO DISMISS AT THE END
OF DEFENDANT'S CASE AND IN FAILING TO GRANT
A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
POINT V
ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS.
POINT VI
ALLEGED ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALLEGED ERROR IN ORDERING A JURY TRIAL
OVER OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF.

10
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A. ppellant in its brief sta tes that it requested a non1

jnry trial, and refers to its Notice of Readiness as evidence thereof. \Vhile this writer has not seen the original
Xotice which was filed (it is apparently not with the
record in the Supreme Court), he has seen the copy
which wa~ served upon hin1 as counsel for R.espondent,
and that fonn does not show that either a jury or a
non-jury trial is requested. In fact, that particular line
is left blank so that both the words "non" and "jury"
appear before the word "trial."
\Yhile counsel for Appellant now clairns that he was
prejudiced by a jury trial, he points to nothing in the
record which would so indicate nor does he show that he
was unable to prepare for trial before a jury. Actually
he should have been aware of the fact that the case \Vas
to be 'tried before a jury on or about Septe1nber 11 when
he received a copy of the letter sent to the trial judge
referring to the fact that the jury fee had been paid.
He admits he became aware of it on October 24, six days
before the trial. Thereafter, the Court further advised
counsel for Appellant that if he felt he would be unable
to be ready for trial by October 30, the trial could be
continued in order to give him more tin1e adequately
to prepare. At that time Appellant's position was that
Respondent was not entitled to a jury trial because
no proper demand had been made and not because of
any inconvenience or hardship.
This Court has on several occasions had before it
the question of whether a jury trial should be allowed
where no proper demand has been made ; and in ea:ch
11
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instance it has held that the granting or denial oi' a
jury trial is within the discretion of the trial court.
In the case of Wood vs. B. G. W. By. Co., 28 U 351,
79 P 182, the Court held that the granting of a jury trial
when no proper demand had been made wa~ discretionary with the trial court. \V e quote :
"We are of the opinion that the court below
possessed discretionary authority to direct a trial
by jury notwithstanding the parties to the suit
may have waived the san1e."
In the case of Davis vs. D. & B. G. Ry. Co., 45 U 11,
1-12 P 705, the Court held :
''Finally it is contended that the court erred
in penni tting a jury to be called to try the case
for ~the reason that the jury fee was not paid until
a few minutes before the case was called for trial.
Our constitution (article 1, 10) provides: 'A
jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.' Comp. Laws 1907, 3129, among other
things, provides that a jury must be demanded
in writing 'prior to the time of setting such action
for trial, or within such reasonable time thereaf1ter as the cou1i. n1ay order, or orally in open
court at the time of such setting,' and the party
demanding a jury 'must at the same time deposit
wi1th the clerk the sum of $5.00, whereupon it
shall be the duty of the court to order jurors to
be in attendance at the time set for the trial of
the cause.' In this case a jury was properly demanded, but the fee was not paid except as above
stated. The pttrpose of the demand, as appears
from the foregoing statute, .is to enable the court
to have a jury in attendance when the case cornes
on for trial. We think that where a jury is in fact
present so that the trial may forthwith proceed

12
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wHhout delay, the .adverse party cannot succes:::;fully interpose the objection that the jury has not
been demanded or the jury fee paid in the precise
manner and at the precise time prscribed by the
statute. The provisions in the statute are not
i nt (>nd e:d for the benefit of an adversary. X o
doubt if the de1nand and payment are not made
as required hy the statute ·the party has waived
hi~ right to require the court to call a jury, but
we cannot see how the adverse party can complain
if the court, in its discretion, permits a jury to
try the case if one is in fact in attendance and no
delay is occasioned in proceeding with the case.
In our judgment, ,,·here a jury is in attendance
the court may permit a party to pay the jury fee
at an~· time before a trial, and may impanel a
jury to tr~· the case. In principle we see no difference between the case at bar and Ogden Valley.
etc., Co. v. Lewis, 125 Pac. 687, where we held
the question of calling a jury, where the right to
de1nand one has been waived, to be largely within
the discretion of the· court, and that the calling
of a jury b~· the court to try a case where a jury
has been waived is not error." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant cites no authority in support of its clain1,
but counsel does state that he "·as "prohibited from obtaining a new panel under provision 78-46-23." There
can be no justlfication for this statement, because under
the provisions of Section 78-46-23, U.C.A. 1953 any person may obtain a new jury venire by paying the fee
prescribed by the statute not later than the day preceding the trial. In the instant ease Appellant had five days
after receiving actual notice of the fact that the case was
to be tried to a jury in \Vhich to determine wh~her it
was satisfied with the regular panel or whether to ask
for a special venire.

13
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As the trial court advised Appellant's counsel, there
being no rule in the 5th Judicial District fixing any time
in which a Demand for a Jury Trial Inust be made, the
Court had as a practice granted a jury trial when req"ll;ested at any time prior to the date set for the trial.
POINT II
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN EXCLUDING
ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES FROM THE COURTROOM WHEN PLAINTIFF INVOKED THE EXCLUSION
RULE.

Appellant contends rthat it was prejudiced by the
Court excluding all of the witnesses from the Courtroom,
including a witness which Appellant planned to use as
its chief witness for a "substantial part of the trial".
"\Vhile it is true that the Court, upon Appellant's request,
did exclude all witnesses, including Ray Tuttle, a sales
representative for Appellant Cmnpany, ,,~ho had most of
t~e negotiations and conversations with Respondent concerning the purchase of the equipment, it was not for a
substantial part of the trial. The trial lasted four days
during which Respondent was on the witness stand for
approxima;tely a day and a half. ~1r. Tuttle was actually
absent from the courtroom less than an hour during the
early part of ~lr. vVilson's testilnony. The record before
the Court discloses that ~the Court convened at 1:30 in
the afternoon of October 30th after having impaneled the
jury in the forenoon. (Tr. 2) At that time the motion
to exclude the witnesses was n1ade by Appellant's counsel and a considerable discussion took place between
counsel and the Court concerning whether l\fr. Tuttle
should also be excluded if other witnesses were excused.

14
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This involved smne ti1ne as the record shows. (Tr. 2-8)
rrhereaft<>r, counsel for Defendant made his opening
~tate1nent which took up a subs,tantial period of time so
that :\I r. \rilson had jus1t begtm to testify at the time of
the afternoon reces~. As a rna.tter of fact, as stated hy
Appellant in its briPf, objection was made to the testimony of .Mr. Wilson with respect to his conversation with
~[r. Tuttle because 11r. Tuttle was not in the courtroom
and it wa~ at this point that the, Court took the afternoon
recess.- Upon convening after the recess, the Court
allO\n~cl .Mr. TutHe to come into the courtroom over
Respondent's objection, the Court stating:
"THE COURT: The record should show in
that regard that pending the recess Mr. Howard
has exhibited to the Court a Supreme Court case
in the State of Utah which in substance and effect
provides that the Court within its discretion may
permit a representative of the party to be in the
Conrtroom even though the exclusion rule has
been £n t·oked; and :Mr. H.oward has chosen ~Ir.
Ray Tuttle and therefore the Court in its discretion has permitted him to return to the Courtroom. And your objecion is denied at this point."
(Tr. 12-13) (Emphasis added.))
A~

the trial court pointed out, in the case of Xanakis t·s. Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., 1 U2d 299, 265 P2d
100, this Court held that it is discretionary with the trial
court whether a representative of the opposing party
ma~T remain the courtroom although he is not an officer
and may he used as a witness. However, it is significant
to point out that in the Xanakis Case the Plaintiff had
invoked the exclusion rule; and the Defendant requested
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the privilege of retaining one person in the courtroom.
In the present instance, it was the Plaintiff who asked
that the rule he invoked .and at the san1e' time claimed the
right to an exception thereto. As stated in 53 Am. Jur.
THIALS, Section 32, Page 47:
"lt has been said that where the rule regarding the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom
is invoked, unless some good reason is shown, all
of the witnesses should he included."

This is in keeping with the provisions of Rule 43(f)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides :
"Upon motion of ei~ther party, the court shall
exclude from the courtroom any witness of the
adverse party, not at the time under examination,
so thart he may not hear the testimony of the other
witnesses."
To the same effeCJt is Section 78-7-4, U.C.A. 1953,
which provides in part :
"In .any cause the Court may, in its discretion, during the examination of a witness exclude
any and all other witnesses in the cause."
Appellant does nort show any prejudice by the witness being absent from the courtro01n. As a matter of
fact, the testimony elicited from Respondent during the
tin1e that Ray Tuttle was absent fron1 the courtroom was
preliminary and did not relate to any 1natters whlch
would have been of direct concern to :Mr. Tuttle. However, if counsel for Appellant h.ad been really concerned,
he could have obtained a transcript of that testimony
frmn the court reporter with very little expense.
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POINT III
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN ADMITTING
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 8.

\Yltile Appellant's point is that ·the CouDt improperl~T
admitted Defendant's Exhibit 8 over the objection of the
Plaintiff, the discussion in the brief goes to the merits
of the controversy and particularly to the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain this verdict. Unfortunately the
tP~timony relating to this rnaHer has no't been tranf1cribed and submitted to this Court as a part of the
record. However, Respondent will present this matter
under Point IY and lin1it the present discussion to the
issue expre~sed in the heading, whether the trial court
erred in admitting into evidence Defendant's Exhibit
~~o. 8. "\Vhile all of the evidence does not appear to
have been transcribed \\Tith respect to this matter (Respondent'~ testimony on cross-exmnination as to when
he located his cop~T of the letter and the circumstances
surrounding ih; being \\Titten), the initial proceedings
under which the Exhibit was offered and received do
appear to be transcribed and before this Court. (See
Tr. pp 37 -42)
In hi;:; Interrogatories to the Plaintiff, Defendant
requested the Plaintiff to answer any written correspondence had taken place between the parties in respect
to the perforrnance or use of the equipment or the alleged
failure of such equip1nent to function properly, and
asked that copies of all such correspondence whether
sent or received be attached to the answer. (R. 11) In
its Answers to such inquiry, Appellant stajted that one
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letter, dated October 2, 1958, was attachd and went on
to say, "This does not purpovt to be all of ,the correspondence which l\1r. 'Vilson 1nay have engaged in with
representatives of Jmnes ~Ianufacturing Company. It
does represent the only correspondence presently located at the hon1e office." (Tr. 18)
Again rut the trial Respondent called upon Appellant
to produce the original copy of the letter which Respondent testified had been sent to it. Appellant did
not do so and in faCit did not at any time during the
trial, which lasted for four days, ever attempt to explain
why the original of the letter was not produced in court.
Under such circumstances the Exhibit (a carbon copy of
a letter sent to Appellant by Respondent) would have
been admissible as secondary evidence of the contents of
the original letter. See Sec. 78-25-16, U.C.A. 1953. However, this Coui'It has previously adopted the view that a
carbon copy of a document made in connection with the
typing of the original thereof is of equal effect as the
original copy and may be received in evidence without
first es~tablishing the whereabouts of the original copy.
In the case of De Michele vs. Insurance Company,
40 U 312, 120 P 846, this Court laid down the rule of
law which has since been applied in this state in respect
to the admissability of a carbon copy of a docun1ent:
"In International Harvester Co. of America
vs. Elfstrom, 101 Minn. 263, 112 N. W. 252,- 12
L.R.A. (N.S.) 343, 118 Am. St. Rep. 626, 11 Ann.
Cas. 107, the rule that gove~rns under such circumstances is stated in the headnote as follows:
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·· 'The different ntunbers or i1npressions of a
writing produced by placing carbon paper between shee1ts of paper and writing upon the exposed surface are duplicate originals and either
ma~T be introduced in evidence without accounting
for the nonproduc1tion of the other.'
"A mere' inspection of the proofs of loss kept
by llir. Davis, .a duplicate of which had been
served on lli r. Brummitt, discloses that it was
what is eommonly called a carbon copy and was
thus a duplicate original within the rule s1t.ated
by the Supreine Court of l\finnesota in the Elfstrom Case just referred to. The precise question
here involved was before the Missouri Court of
Appeals in Catron v. Ins. Co., 67 Mo. App. 544.
In that case the copy of the proofs of loss that
was retained by the insured was, over the objection of the c01npany, admitted in evidence without serving notice upon the company to produce
the one served upon it and without aecounting
for that one. The court held that the paper was
properly admitted in evidence under the rule
which applies to duplicate originals. To the, same
effect is the case of Westbrook v. Fulton, 79 Ala.
510. The district court, therefore, did not err in
adn1itting in evidenee respondent's proofs of
loss."
See also American Surety Company vs. Blake, 54
Idaho 1, :27 P:2cl 972, where the Court held that a carbon
impression of a letter which was testified was mailed to
the Plaintiff cmnpany was ad1nissible without showing
that a previous demand had been made upon the company to produce the original, quoting from two cases
from other jurjsdictions, .as follows:
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''In the ease of ::\Iartin & Lanier Paint Co. v:-~.
Daniels, 27 Ga. App. 302, 108 S. E. 2-tG, the
second paragraph of the sylabus reads: 'Duplicate or carbon copies of letters made by· the same
pencil at the smne time are not 'copies', but duplicate originals, and could be introduced in evidence
without notice to produce.' In the case of Prescott, Wright, Snider Co. v. Cit)? of Cherryvale,
134 Kan. 53 4 P. (2d) 457, 459, the court uses this
language: 'The carbon impression of the leHer
wri1tten on a typewriter made with the same
stroke of the :keys as was done here may be
treated as original, and hence either may be received as primary evidence.'"
subn1its that it was not necessary to
1nake a prior den1and upon Appellant for production of
the original cop)· of the letter; but that in any event such
a de1nand was made through the Interrogatories and at
the ti1ne of trial, and tha1t Appellant had adequate time
to have searched its records to see if it had the original
of the leNer, the carbon copy of which was introduced in
evidence.
Re~·pondent

POINT IV
ALLEGED ERROR OF THE COURT IN FAILING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END
OF DEFENDANT'S CASE AND IN FAILING TO GRANT
A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

The general rulP as to the review of the weight and
suffidene)· of the evide·nce where a full report of the
evideneP is not brought to the attention of the reviewing
court is well stated in 4 Am. J11r. :2d, APPEAL AXD
ERROR, See. 52:3, p. 958, as follows:
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"The -wPight and sufficiency of the evidence
cannot ordinarily be reviewed unless all of the
evidence is hrought before the appellaA:e court by
a bill of exceptions or i'ts equivalent."
The cases cited under this staten1ent include the ease
of Sandall rs. Sa11dal1, 57 F. 150, 193 P 1093, 15 ALR
G:20, cleeided b~· this Court in 1920. As there stated by
this CouPt, allPged error as to the insufficiency of the
Pvidence will not be considered b~· the Court on appeal
where the evidence is not reported to the Court, citing
numerous 1~tah easP~. The rnost recent ease on this point
i:-; I11 Re r' oorhees Estate, 12 U 2d 361, 366 P2d 977,
where tht• Court held that since no transcript of the hearing -was n1ade and submitted to the Supren1e Court the
findings of the trial court would be assumed to be supported h~· the evidence.
This is in keeping also with the statement of law
found in 4 .Am. Jur . .2d, APPEAL AXD ERROR, Section
.):2:3, p. 959, as follows:
··If the evidence is not in the record, the presunlption is that it was sufficient to sustain the
judgment, and that it supported all Findings of
Fact and all facts pleaded and essential to the
judgment. If only part of the evidence is in the
record, the presumption is that the omitted evidence supports the judgment, and that it is sufficient to cure any defects in the evidence brought
up."
In the case of Orand Truck R. Co. z:s. Cumming.s,
106 P.R. 700, :2/ L.ed 266, 1 S. Ct. 493, the Supren1e Court
of the l-nited States held that although a refusal to
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direct a verdiet for the Defendant at the close of Plaintiff's evidence rnay have been error at the time, when the
Defendant afterward introduced evidence in his own behalf, \vhich is not in the record on appeal, it must be
presun1e that at the close of the case the evidence wa~
sufficient to go to the jury.
Appellant contends that there could be no breach of
warranty for the feeder units for five reasons, which
are set forth on page 19 of its brief. These reasons
represent Appellant's position during the trial but unfortunately for it the jur~- did not accept its theory but
found the evidence in favor of Respondent.
1. Appellant rlairns the auger-type feeder units
\H're sold to Respondent b~- rtah Poultry and Farmers
Co-op and not by Plaintiff. Tlris ·was an issue which
,,·as subrnitted to the jury (See Instruction 19, R-58) and
resolved against the Plaintiff. As a rnatter of fact, the
tefltimon~- of Respondent as well as the docun1entary evidence in this case shows that the feeder units were purchased fron1 Jmneswa)- Jfanufaduring Company through
its agent Ray Tuttle (See Exhibits P-9 and D-7).
2. Appellant elaims Defendant purchased the
feeder units based upon his observation of a sample. This
is not correct. Respondent testified that he contacted
Ray Tuttle, Appellant\; representative, because he had
seen a twelve-foot section of the feeder unit in operwtion
and wa ..; intPrPsted in it, but that he bought the unit
based upon the representations n1ade to hin1 by Ray
Tuttle that the auger-type equipment would push the
feed for a distance of 400 feet filling the trough with
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fred ~o that the sn1a1l turkey poults could eat
(Tr. 13, 1-t, -t8)

~therefrom.

3. Appellant further claims the buyer was an experienced turlwy operator who ordered a particular
piece of Inerchandise for his own purposes. vV e agree
that Respondent was an experienced turkey operator, but
he was not an experienced equipment 1nan and went to
Ha~· Tuttle, who wa~ a sales representative, in order to
determine whetlwr the equipn1ent which he had seen
would be suitable for his operation and meet his needs.
This is si1nilar to the situation involved in the case of
Carver vs. Dunn, 117 U. 180, 214 P2d, 118, where William
(;. Carver of Carver Sheet ttietal W or:ks in connection
with air conditioning equipn1ent which the latter company thereafter sold and installed. rpon a subsequent
claim being made by Carver that he was an installer
onl~y rather than a seller, the Supreme Court sustained
a finding of the trial court that: ''The implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose is not negatived by
the Seller's use of a brand name when it is used merely
for convenience in identifying the equipment to be installed."
Likewise the Court rejected the clain1 of the Plaintiff
in that case that he was merely an installer instead of
a seller and that the purchaser did not rely upon the
judg~nent and skill of the seller in respect to the equipment purchased.

-±. Appellant next clai1ns that Respondent gave no
notice o.f the alleged breach of "~arranty. This is not
the case, as the testimony and the docu1nents before
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the trial court would show. However, \Ye submit that
the matter was properly submitted to the jur~: and that
the jury found the issue against the Appellant in that
respect. Instruction X o. 25 (R. 65) reads as follows:
"You are instructed that in order to find
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff on the defendant'~ counterclai1n yon must
find that the defendant gave notice to the plaintiff of the alleged breach of prmnise or warranty
within a reasonable tin1e after he knew, or should
have known, of such breach of pron1ise or \\·arranty; and you are further instructed that the
notice of breach of warranty need take no special
fonn, however, it n1ust refer to particuar sales
so far as that is practicable, it must fairly advise
the seller of the alleged defects, and it must be
such as to repel any reference that the buyer has
waived the said defects. It must further advise
the seller that the buyer intends to look to him
for dmnages for breach."
5. Finally, Appellant clai1ns that Respondent is
estopped from clain1ing a breach because of his utilization of the equipment. Of course, the statute specifically
provides that a buyer of equipn1ent 1nay retain the
equipinent 'vithout '"~aiving his clailn for dmnages. ~PP
Section 60-3-9, U.C.A. 1953.
Appellant contends not only that the evidence is
insufficient to show notice of clain1ed breach of warranty
in respect to the feeder equip1nent but also in respect
to the ventilator equipment which was purchased and
installed in February of 1958. As shown by the testin1ony in this case, discovery of the defective ventilating
equipn1ent did not ta:ke place until February 1959. (See
24
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Exhibit D-9) The testin1ony \Yhich has not been transcribed would disclose that in the forepart of February,
1959, Respondent was told by Dr. Royal Bagley, (the
vetinarian who had n1ade several inspections of the
coop .and the turkeys, during the 1958 season to attempt
to discover the cause of the high death loss) that during
an inspedion in Jan nary 1959 he had observed a downward draft through the ventilators. Respondent innnediately checked the ventilating system and determined
that \\·hen ventilators in one part of the coop were in
operation discharging air fron1 the coop, air would
be drawn through other ventilators in another part of
the coop because there were no dmnpers to shut out the
air. It was further discovered that the canyon breezes
which were prevalent during the night time ·would blow
air down through the ventilators into the coops directly
onto the small turkeys that were then being brooded
in the coops. IIm11ediately steps were taken to correct
the situation by the installation of damper-like devices
to prevent the air from being drawn into the coops. As
Exhibit D-9 discloses the 1nortality very quickly subsided
to practically none.
Appellant states 1n its brjef on page 33 that ""it
seems lmbelievable that a person ·would have lost upwards of 30,000 young poults without discovering the
cause of it." However, there was considerable testimony
as to the atte1npts made to ascertain the cause of the
high mortality. Dr. Bagley and others were called in
to assist in determining the cause of the loss but the
real cause \Yas not discovered until February 1959.
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Respondent does not question the provisions of
the statute (Section 60-3-9, U.C.A. 1953) requiring notiee
to the seller of the breach of a prmnise or warranty
within a reasonable time "after the buyer knows, or
ought to ~kno\v, of such breach." \Vhether such notice
has been given, however, is ordinarily a question for
the jury. In the case of Baum vs. 1llnrray, 23 \Yash.
2d 890, 162 P2d 801 (cited with approval by this Court
in Mawlvvnney vs. Jensen, 120 U. 142, 232 P2d 769) appears the following:
"The appellant urges that even though it be
held that the notice given \Vas sufficient it wa~
not given within a reasonable ti1ne and hence
usually a mixed question of law and fact. It
depends upon such a variety of facts and circumstances in each particular case that it usually
resolves itself into a question of fact to be determined by the jury upon proper instruction~
by the court. . . .
Although it n1ay be said that the facts as
to when the notice was given are not in dispute,
reasonable n1inds Illa)· well differ as to the conclusion to be drawn frmn then1, and that being
the case we would not be justified in holding as
a 1natter of law that the notice either was or was
not given within a reasonable tilne."
~The

Washington court also went on to say that in
giving notice all that is necessary is that the Seller
be informed of the facts in some 1nanner sufficient to
advise him that a clain1 is being 1na.de to that effect so
that tlw Seller may govern hhnself accordingly.
Appellant has quoted frmn the annotation in 41
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ALR 2<1. S1:2, 817, but failed to quote that portion of
the annotation relating to whether the issue is one for
the court or the jury. At page 825 of the annotation
appears he following general state1nent:
"Usually, the question of what constitutes
a reasonable time for the buyer to give notice
to the seller of a breach of an express warranty,
is one of fact for the jury. It has been so held
or recognized in the following cases:"
Thereafter appear a great nu1nber of cases frmu various
jurisdictions, including California, Georgia, Illinois,
.Jiassachusetts, .Michigan, X ew York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode, Island and Wisconsin.
In the case of Whitfield vs. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826,
193 P2d 1, the Supreme Court of California states:
"Having in mind the appropriate rule under
this provision of the law of sales, that 'It 1nay
be taken as axiomatic that what constitutes a
reasonable time must be determined from the
particular circumstances in the individual case'
(Columbia Axle Co. v. Arnerican Auto1nobile Ins.
Co., supra, 63 F.2d at page 208), this court cannot say as a n1atter of law that an unreasonable
tilne had elapsed. Certainly the time did not
commence to run before :Mrs. 'Vhitfield knew the
disease ·was undulant fever .... What constitutes
a reasonable time where the goods sold are foods
containing latent defects, which are in1mediately
consumed, presents a different question than does
the ordinary sale where the article is subject to
examination and use which will reveal its defect."
A Fortiori when all of the evidence as to the tin1e
and nature of the notice g1ven for the alleged breach
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of warranty is not before this Court, the rul<· stated
in 4 Am. Jur. 2d. APPEAL AXD ERROR, Section 5:23,
applies, to the effect that the weight and sufficienc~·
of the evidence 'vill be presu1ned in favor of t lit> judgment.
Respondent respectfully sub1nits that there was no
error committed by the trial court in refusing Appellant's motion for dismissal or 1notion for a directed
verdict.
POINT V
ALLEGED ERRORS IN INSTRUCTIONS.

Complaint is n1ade that the court erred 1n giving
certain instructions to the jury. Although the instructions given by the court are in the record on appeal,
there is nothing in the record to indicate to which of
these instructions, if any, Appellant ~cepted. Rule 5
of the Utah Rules of Ciril Procedure provides that "No
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party n1ust state
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds
of his objection."
\Vhile the Rule further states that notwithstanding
the foregoing requirement this Court 1nay in its discretion and in the interests of justice consider alleged error
in the giving or failure to give of instructions, there
is no wa~· for this Court to know whether the instructions
were or were not proper without having the evidence
before it on which the instructions were based.
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Again referring to -!Am. Jur. 'l.d APPEAL AN"D
ERROR, Sedion 536, we find the following statement
of law:
"Insofar as the correctness of the charge
1nay turn on evidence, its correctness is not open
to consideration on appeal when the evidence
i8 not in the record, at least where there is no
sufficient state1nent of facts showing what the
evidence tended to prove or that it raised the
questions on which the instructions are based."
As stated above the only 1natter which can be reviewed by the appellant courts where the evidence is
not before it is whether the charge is a correct statement
of law. In this respect there is no question but that
Instruction No. 11 contains a correct state1nent of the
law.

Section 60-5-!, U.C.A. 1953, (subparagraphs 6 & 7),
sets forth the 1neasure of dmnages for breach of a warranty as follows:
"6. The measure of dmnages for breach of \Yarranty is the loss directly and naturally resulting
in the ordinary course of events from the breach
of warranty.
7. In the case of breach of warranty of quality,
such loss, in the absence of special circumstances
showing proximate dmnaqe of a greater amount,
is the difference between the value of goods at
the time of delivery to the buyer and the value
they would have had if they had answered to the
warranty." (Emphasis added)
Under the foregoing provisions of the statute it was
necessary for the Court to define the phrase proximate
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damage or proximate cause. Howt>ver, the pertinent
instruction on the 1neasure of darnages i:-; Instruction
No. 29 (R. 69) which reads as follows:
"You are instructed that Section 60-5-7, l~tah
Code Annotated 1953, insofar as applicable here
provides that 'The measure of damages for
breach of warranty is the loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events
from the breach of warranty.'
If you find the issues in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff on Defendant'~
Counterclaim, it will be your duty to award the
Defendant such dmnages, if any, as you may find
from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly
and adequately c01npensate him for the damage
he has sustained as a proxilnate result of the
breach of warranty.''
Insofar as this writer can re1ne1nber, this instruction
was never excepted by Appellant, although Appellant
did object to the definition of the tenn "proximate
cause" as given by the Court in Instruction No. 11 after
it had been given.
There was considerable testi1nony from experts
other than Dr. Bagley as to the effect the drafts and
exposure caused by the defective equip1nent would have
on the young turkey poults. They gave as their opinion
that death under the circu1nstances related was caused
by such condition.
The fact that the jury found in favor of the Respondent against Appellant for only $8,000.00 of the
clain1 which excluded $25,000.00 in actual dan1age is
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indicative of the fact that the jury also detennined that
:-;ome of the loss was due to other factors and causes.
lt seems that Appellant has no basis for con1plaint when
the jury has exonerated it frmn liability for a substantial
portion of the lo,ss which Respondent sustained.
Appellant cmnplains of Instruction No. 16 because
it does not give all of the provisions of the statute with
respect to implied warranty. However, Respondent overlooks the fact that Instruction No. 23 relates to the
exceptions given under the statue and was given at
the instance of Appellant to cover the particular situation which Appellant urges in his brief. If Appellant
felt that this instruction did not adequately cover the
matter he should have directed the Court's attention
to it in order that the Court could have given a more
complete instruction. However, Respondent's position is
that the evidence did not justify the submission to the
jury of either of the ite1ns contained in subsections 2 or
3 of Section 60-1-15, and therefo,re that the Court should
not have given even the instruction No. 23 referred to.
Insofar as this writer is able to ascertain no exception was taken to the Court's Instruction No. 18. The
only claim nmv made is that is pennitted the jury to
inquire as to whether the financal transactions were
such as were darned by the Plaintiff in this case or as
claimed by the Defendant. Since this was a n1atter
which was in issue betewen the parties and on which
evidence was introduced, there seems to be no reason
why this instruction should not have been given.
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The Appellant further cmnplains because the Court
gave Instruction K o. 33 relating to two verdict fonns,
one verdict fonn which required the Jury to find against
the Defendant on the counterclaim and the other which
permitted the Jury to find in favor of the Defendant
on the counterclain1 without specifying whether it was
one or both of the Counts. The form of the verdict
is within the discretion of the trial court. The verdict
forms permitted the Jury to find against Respondent
or in his favor and to assess the runount of the damage~
if they found he was entitled to recover. Since the
e'vidence was sufficient to find in favor of the Respondent on both counts there can be no reason why Appellant should cornplain because they were not separated
in the ve·rdict form.
POINT VI
ALLEGED ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL.

Appellant complains because the Court failed to
grant its motion for a new trial. In stating the circumstances giving rise to the 1natter of 1noving for a new
trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, Appe,llant states that "A request was made for a continuance after the Defendant had rested and before rebuttal testilnony was had, and the Court allowed the
Plaintiff a few minutes in which to obtain the necessary
witnesses. Unfortunately, the Plaintiff was not able
to obtain witnesses necessary to establish the facts
attached to its 1notion for a new trial." The fact of
the matter is that near the close of the trial and some
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time before it concluded, Appellant re-subpoened one
of Plaintiff's witnesses, to-wit: Glen \Yilson, to corne
bac:k into Court, and also issued a subpoena for two
other individuals, one of whom was in fact subpoened
and ca1ne to Court. .Mr. Glen Wilson was interrogated
at some length by counsel for Appellant in respect to
the 1natter of the water used in connection with the
turkc•y operation in the year in question, and specifially
aske<l whether the water 1nay have caused the death
of any of the turkeys. l\lr. Wilson testified that turkeys
had been brooded on the property for 1nany years prior
to 1958-59 with no difficulty and that in the years sub~equent

thereto the san1e water had been used until1962

and that there had been no abnonnal mortality resulting
therefrom. This evidence was introduced by Appellant,
\dlO

had subpoened Glen Wilson. The other witness

did not arrive at the courtroom at the time the case
was

concluded, and the Court thereupon continued the

matter for approximately an hour in order for the
\\itness to be located and brought into court. When
the witness arrived, counsel for Appellant asked for a
recess for him to interrogate the witness and did so,
after which he returned to the courtroom and stated
that he did not wish to call this person as a witness.
This, of course, could be construed only as indicating
that this witness would not testify as the Appellant
hoped he would do. Insofar as any other witness is
concerned, Appellant asked for no continuance in the
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trial in nrder to obtain additional evidence, nor did he
ask the Court to grant pennission for further time in
which to investigate the matters which apparently he
claiu1s came to his attention during the trial.
In view of these circumstance:-;, it is our position
that the case of Lindsey vs. Eccles liotel Company,
3 U. 2d 364, 284 P2d 477. is applicable. There the Plaintiff urged that a ne,,· trial should have been granted
because of newly discovered evidence when the Plaintiff had two days before the trial discovered a 1naterial
witness who was ill. He did not, ho·wever, request the
Court for a continuance of the trial or state that one of
his important witnesses would not be available at the
trial. Thereafter, upon losing the case he filed a motion
for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.
The motion was denied. On appeal this Court affirmed,
stating: "In such an atmosphere we cannot say the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new
trial under Rule 59 (a) ( 4), r tah Rules of Civil Procedure."
Again 1n the case of Thorley vs. /( olob F·ish and
Game Cftnb, 13 U. 2d 294, 373 P2d 514, in affirming the
trial court's refusal to grant a new trial, this Court said:
•·Insofar as the denial of appellant's motion
for a new trial or for leave to reopen is concerned,
we are not persuaded that the court abused its
discretion in denying the n1otion. The main
ground for the n1otion was ne\dy discovered evidence which consisted of testinwny of an engineer
who has by affidavit stated that the plaintiff
could not be <:-redited with placing 8,400 cubic
34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

yard~

of material in the drun since there was
only 3,500 cubic yards moved; and therefore, the
plaintiff Inust have been paid on a lump sum
figure basj s, and not on a cost per yard basis.
This testiinony has the tendency of i1npeaching
the plaintiff and there is no reason shown why
appellant did not produce such evidence at the
trial. This n1otion was properly denied by the
lower court because the appellants did no't con1ply with Rule 59 (c) in filing the affidavit timely.
(The affidavit was filed 43 days after the entry
of judgment). vVe do not ordinarily disturb the
ruling of the trial court in denying a motion for
a new trial unless there has been abuse on the
part of the trial judge, which is not present here."

In the instant case Appellant assigns no reason
why the testimony, if any, which would now be produced
could not have been produced at the initial trial . In
any event there is no testimony .and would be no testimony to the effect that the mineral content of the water
used in the year 1958-1959 was the same as that tested
by the chemists in the year 1962. Appellant had adequate
opportunity to cheek the \Vater before trial and called
two witnesses in respect to the Inatter. However, Appellant's argument at the tilne of trial w.as that the mortality of the turkeys \\·as due to specific diseases which
were identified in the autopsies on one or two of the
birds and that death did not occur because of any other
factors. It now seeks to reverse its position and elai1n
some other cause or contributing cause which is not supported by the evidence since we have no way of determining what the 1nineral content of the water was in
1958-1959.
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We respectfully submit that the n1atter of whether
a new trial should be granted upon newly discovered
evidence or otherwise is one which rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court, and that in the absence
of a clear abuse of dscretion the determination of the
trial court should not be overruled. Again, since the
testimony at the trial is put before this Court, it must
presume that the trial court was more familiar with the
facts and the evidence and that it acted within its
judicial prerogative in denying Appellant's n1otion for
a new trial.

CONCLUSIOX
Respondent respectfully urges that the matters
raised by Appellant in its brief are without Inerit and
that no error was com1nitted by the trial court in any
of the matters referred to. In any event, Respondent
desires to refer the Court to Rule 61, r.R.C.P. which
provides:
"No error in either the admission or exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or anything done or mnitted by
the Court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judg1nent or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the Court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The Court at every stage of
the proceeding 1nust disregard any error or defeet in the proceeding W'hich does not effect the
substantial rights of the parties."
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In this conection, Respondent respectfully subn1its
that Appellant has failed to show wherein anything done
or omitted to be done by the trial court resulted in any
substantial injustice, and therefore the judgn1ent should
be affin11ed.

Respectfully sub1nitted,
Arthur H. Nielsen
KIELSEN, CONDER and HANSEN
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, lTtah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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